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Abstract
The present paper analyses employment subsidies to vocational
training under union wage bargaining. The analysis includes an in-
vestigation of the consequences of nancing the subsidy by a levy on
employment, which is the typical way of nancing these types of sub-
sidies in many countries. The paper demonstrates high incidence rates
of subsidies to vocational training under standard assumptions about
the preference structure of the union. The nancing scheme appears
to counteract the purpose of the subsidy.
Thanks to Daniel le Maire for comments to the paper. Department of Economics,
University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 5, bygning 26, 1455 København K. Email:
Karsten.Albaek@econ.ku.dk.
1
1 Introduction
In most countries employer provided training plays a role in human capital
formation. Many countries, if not a majority, have some extent of employ-
ment subsidies to further vocational training. National programmes, includ-
ing work related training of young people as an alternative to pure school
based human capital, is a common phenomenon.
A prototypical example of a large scale apprenticeship vocational training
programme is the German case. It is analysed in Dustmann and Schönberg
(2009) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), who emphasize the importance
of noncompetitive wage setting in human capital formation. Large scale
apprenticeship programmes also exist in Germanys neighbouring countries
to the South and the North and in Australia and New Zealand.1
Stevens (2001) analyses the ability of training subsidies to overcome fail-
ures in the market for training. In the model set-up by Malcomson et al.
(2003), the result is an explicit recommendation of a public subsidy to over-
come incentive problems inherent in apprenticeship contracts.
The present paper analyses employment subsidies to vocational training
under unionised wage bargaining. Unionisation is a characteristic of many
countries which have formal vocational training programmes, especially coun-
tries with large scale apprenticeship programmes.
Some amount of incidence of employment subsidies is a standard result in
union models, see for example the surveys in Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004)
and Booth (1995). The present paper demonstrates sharper results in the
case of employment subsidies to vocational training.
The analysis is conducted in a union wage-setting model. This is a stan-
dard assumption in the analysis of active labour market policy, see for ex-
ample Calmfors and Lang (1995).
In many countries a typical way to nance employment subsidies to train-
ing is a levy on employment. The analysis includes an investigation of the
e¤ects of this type of nancing.
If large shares of youth cohorts follow the vocational training path, the
cost of employment subsidies is substantial. Subsidy schemes for large shares
1A major source to vocational training programmes in various countries is the country
surveys of the European Community organisation CEDEFOP.
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of youth cohorts of the type analysed in the present paper are a policy issue
in for example Germany and they are implemented in Austria and Denmark.
The relevance of the analysis of the paper is not conned to vocational
training but can be applied to any groups where attempts are made to further
employment by employment subsidies. However, vocational training schemes
are the leading case and to x ideas, participants are termed apprentices in
the paper.
The paper is organised as follows. The model is presented in section (2)
and it is solved in section (3). The solution is interpreted in section (4),
which deals with the consequences of the relative valuation the union attach
to its goals, and in section (5), which analyse the e¤ects of nancing the
subsidy by an employment tax. Eventually the paper contains a discussion
of the results.
2 The model
The utility function is assumed to be

 = U (n;wn) + V (a; wa) ; Un > 0; Uwn > 0; Va > 0; Vwa  0: (1)
where n is the number of employed workers or union members, wn is the wage
rate for workers, a the number of employed apprentices and wa the wage rate
for apprentices. The utility function is separable in utility for union members
and utility of apprentices.
The policy measure considered in the paper is a subsidy to employ ap-
prentices. The magnitude of the subsidy is denoted s, and the total costs
of the subsidy scheme is thus sa. Complete nancing of the costs of sub-
sidies by an employment tax entails the budget constraint tn = sa, where
t is the employment tax. However, it is assumed that the employment tax
on workers only nances the subsidy costs with the share , while the share
1    comes from other sources. The magnitude of the employment tax is
thus t = sa=n. The assumption of partial nancing is a mean to isolate the
e¤ect of the nancing. Nothing prevents setting  = 1 after the derivations.
The costs of employing workers, c, and apprentices, d, are
c = wn + t = wn + sa=n
d = wa   s:
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Noting that dwa = 1 and ds =  1, the derivatives of the costs of employing
members become
cwa = s
@ (a=n)
@d
(2)
cs = 
a
n
  s@ (a=n)
@d
cwa + cs = 
a
n
> 0:
No employment tax,  = 0, implies cwa = 0 and cs = 0.
Demand functions derived from prot maximisation are assumed to be
n (c; d) ; nc < 0; nd > 0; (3)
a (c; d) ; ac > 0; ad < 0:
The derivatives of the demand functions with respect to the wage rate of
apprentices are
nwa = nd + nccwa
awa = ad + accwa :
Applying (2) to the expressions for the impact of the subsidy on the
demand for members and apprentices yields
ns = ndds + nccs =  nwa + nc
a
n
(4)
as = adds + accs =  awa + ac
a
n
:
Inserting the demand functions (3) into (1), the indirect utility function
becomes
 = U (n (c; d) ; wn) + V (a (c; d) ; wa) :
3 Solution of the model
Under the assumption that the union sets wage rates, the rst order condi-
tions are
wn = Unnwn + Uwn + Vaawn = 0
wa = Unnwa + Vwa + Vaawa = 0:
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In order to keep the derivations tractable, changes in demand are ap-
proximated by changes in the levels while changes in the slope of the demand
functions are ignored, that is, second order derivatives of the demand func-
tions are set equal to zero.
Second order own derivatives are
wnwn = Unnn
2
wn + 2Unwnnwn + Uwnwn + Vaaa
2
wn < 0
wawa = Unnn
2
wa + 2Vawaawa + Vwawa + Vaaa
2
wa < 0:
These inequalities follow per assumption.
The second order cross derivative is
wnwa = Unnnwnnwa + Uwnnnwa + Vawaawn + Vaaawnawa 7 0:
It is not possible to sign wnwa without further assumptions. Assume that
wages and employment are complements in the utility of the union in the
sense that Uwnn > 0 and Vawa > 0. Then it follows that wnwa > 0 (and
the two rst inequalities also follow). The assumption of complementarity
is a su¢ cient but not necessary condition to obtain the signs. Wages and
employment are complements in the standard utilitarian utility function and
in for example the CES utility function.
Di¤erentiating the rst order conditions with respect to s and applying
(4) yields
wns = Unnnwnns + Uwnnns + Vaaawnas (5)
=  wnwa + Vawaawn + 
a
n
E
where E = Unnnwnnc + Uwnnnc + Vaaawnac, and
was = Unnnwans + Vaaawaas + Vwaaas (6)
=  wawa + Vwaaawa + Vwawa + 
a
n
F;
where F = Unnnwanc + Vwaaac + Vaaawaac.
The system determining the multipliers with respect to the subsidy rate
is 
wnwn wnwa
wnwa wawa
 
@wn=@s
@wa=@s

=

wnwa   Vawaawn    anE
wawa   Vwaaawa   Vwawa    anF

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The determinant of the hesse matrix is D = wnwnwawa  2wnwa, D > 0
per assumption.
The solution is
@wn=@s
@wa=@s

=

0
1

  1
D

Vawa (wawaawn   wnwaawa)  wnwaVwawa
wnwnVwawa + Vawa (wnwnawa   wnwaawn)

+
a
n
F
D

wnwa   EFwawa
E
F
wnwa   wnwn

: (7)
The solution consists of three items on the right hand side, which are to
be interpreted.
4 The role of union preferences
The procedure is to specialise the solution into the simplest case and then
proceed to the characterisation of more complex cases. Simpler cases than
the full solution are denoted by superscripts attached to the multiplies.
This section contains an interpretation of the rst two terms on the right
hand side of (7). The point of departure is thus the case  = 0, such that the
subsidy is not nanced by an employment tax but in some other way, which
does not enter into the wage formation process. This assumption implies
that the third expression on the right hand side of (7) goes away.
The benchmark case is Vwa = 0, implying Vwawa = Vawa = 0, which arises
in the case where the union places zero value on further increases in the wage
of apprentices. This assumption implies that the second expression on the
right hand side of (7) vanishes.
Denoting the multiplies with superscript a in this case, the solution be-
comes (@wn=@s)
a = 0 and (@wa=@s)
a = 1. The impact of a subsidy to employ
apprentices is an increase in the wages of apprentices by the same amount
as the subsidy, while all other variables are una¤ected.
Before the subsidy, the union decided an optimal combination of wage
rates for the members, employment of members and employment of appren-
tices, given the trade-o¤ between the variables determined by the demand
functions for members and apprentices. The introduction of the subsidy im-
plies an increase in employment of apprentices and a decrease in employment
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of members. From the point of view of the union this is not optimal, and
equilibrium is restored by increasing the wages of apprentices by the same
amount as the subsidy. This leaves employment of apprentices and members
at the same level as before the subsidy, and the same is the case with the
wage level for members. It is worth emphasizing that the basic assumption
is that the union cares about employment of apprentices; if this was not
the case, the union would render employment of apprentices diminutive by
increasing the wage rate of apprentices without bounds.
Next assume that Vwa > 0 and Vwawa < 0, such that the union places
a positive but diminishing value of a marginal increase in the wages of the
apprentices. Assume furthermore that Vawa = 0, such that the utility of the
union is separable in apprentice employment and the wage of the appren-
tices. The assumption  = 0 is maintained. Denoting the solution in this
case with superscript b, the multiplier for the wages of apprentices becomes
(@wa=@s)
b = 1 wnwnVwawa=D. As utility maximization implies wnwn < 0
and D > 0, the result is (@wa=@s)
b < 1.
When the union cares about the wages of the apprentices, the value of
increases at the margin is diminishing, and the union will thus not allow
the wage rate of apprentices to increase by the full amount of the subsidy.
Further increases in the wage rate are not valued to the same extend as
previous increases, and this makes a check on the amount that wages for
apprentices go up as a consequence of the subsidy. Instead the union applies
a part of the subsidy to the other purposes which the union cares about, in
particular employment of apprentices.
Under the previous assumption, the union did not care about the wage
rate of the apprentices, and wage rates for apprentices were thus set in order
to obtain desired levels of the entities that enter into the utility function of
the union. The outcome in the present case is thus the intuitive but perhaps
paradoxical result that when the union actually cares about the wages of
the apprentices, the increase in the wage as a consequence of a wage subsidy
is smaller compared to the situation when the union does not care about
the wage of apprentices. This is a result which is valid on the margin, and
nothing is said about the levels of the wage rates for apprentices in the two
cases.
The e¤ect on the wage rate for members becomes (@wn=@s)
b = wnwaVwawa=D.
In the case where wnwa > 0, the e¤ect on the wage rate for members becomes
(@wn=@s)
b < 0. A su¢ cient condition for wnwa > 0 is Uwnn > 0. Increased
employment of apprentices and consequently decreased employment of mem-
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bers leads a decreased marginal valuation of wages for members. If wages
and employment for members are not complements, it cannot be precluded
that wnwa < 0 with the consequence (@wn=@s)
b > 0:
Next consider the more general case with Vwa > 0 and Vwawa < 0,
but Vawa 6= 0, such that the utility of the union is no longer separable in
employment and wages for apprentices. The assumption  = 0 is main-
tained. Denote the multipliers with superscript c. We have (@wa=@s)
b >
(@wa=@s)
c if the second part in the second bracket in (7) in the expression
for @wa=@s is positive. Under the assumption of complementarity the condi-
tion is wnwnawa > wnwaawn. Expressions for the derivatives of the demand
function for apprentices can be obtained under further assumptions. Under
the assumptions of constant elasticity of substitution between employment of
union members and employment of apprentices, constant returns to scale in
production and no scale e¤ect in production arising from changes in aggregate
labour costs, the Marshall-Hicks equations can be invoked, see for example
Hamermesh (1993). The condition becomes wnwn <  wawnwnwa. This in-
equality is likely to be fullled for two reasons. The wages of apprentices
typically constitute less than one half of wages for members. Furthermore,
second order cross derivatives of the indirect utility function are on average
dominated in numerical value by the second order own derivatives, see the
expression for D.
The corresponding part in the expression for the multiplier for the wage
rate of members becomes positive such that (@wn=@s)
b > (@wn=@s)
c if wawaawn >
wnwaawa. After invoking the Marshall-Hicks equations, the condition be-
comes wawa >  wnwawnwa, which is less helpful with respect to signing the
multiplier. In the case when wages and employment are not complements, the
magnitude of the multipliers relative to the case Vawa 6= 0 is undetermined.
5 The e¤ect of nancing the subsidy
Finally consider the e¤ect of nancing stemming from the third term on the
right hand side of (7). The following discussion is valid irrespective of the
value of , which could be set to full nancing or partial nancing.
Under the assumption of complementarity between wage rates and em-
ployment it is possible to sign the values to E < 0 in (5) and F > 0 in (6)
such that E=F < 0. The rst and the last utility terms in both the nu-
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merator and denominator of E=F are identical and they dominate the cross
derivative utility terms in the middle term numerically, see the expression for
D. Furthermore, identical terms of the derivatives of the demand functions
with respect to membership costs enter in both the rst and the last term
of both the numerator and the denominator. The E=F ratio deviates from
one to the extent that the slopes of the demand functions for members and
apprentices di¤er. It is assumed in the following that the numerical value of
the E=F ratio is not so far away from one that it renders an analysis based
on the relative magnitude of the -terms irrelevant.
From D = wnwnwawa 2wnwa > 0 it must be such that either jwnwnj >
jwnwaj or jwawaj > jwnwaj, or both. That is, the last -terms with second
order own derivatives in the last squared parenthesis in (7) tend to dominate
in numerical value over the rst -terms with second order cross derivatives.
If both inequalities hold, the expression in the second line in the last squared
parenthesis in (7) is expected to be positive while the expression in the rst
line is expected to be negative. This implies larger increases in apprenticeship
wages and a decrease in member wages, that is, @wa=@s > (@wa=@s)
c and
@wn=@s < (@wn=@s)
c, where the derivatives without superscripts are the
expressions in (7) while the derivatives with superscript c is the solution
without nancing under the assumption of complementarity.
Both of these wage changes draw in the direction of a reduction in em-
ployment of apprentices relative to employment of members. As the a=n
ratio is reduced, subsidies are also reduced and consequently is the magni-
tude of the employment tax also reduced. If one of the inequalities is not
fullled, then the other inequality is so much more fullled. That is, if wages
for apprentices do not increase, then wages for members decrease strongly.
In the case where the union does not value marginal increases in the wage
of apprentices, implying that the middle term in (7) vanishes, and both of
the above inequalities are fullled, we get @wn=@s < 0 = (@wn=@s)
a and
@wa=@s > 1 = (@wa=@s)
a. This implies a reduced a=n ratio compared to the
level before the introduction of the subsidy.
The expected e¤ect of the nancing scheme is thus a reduction of em-
ployment of apprentices relative to employment of members. The nancing
scheme consequently counteracts the purpose of the employment subsidy to
vocational training.
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6 Discussion
Employment subsidies to further vocational training are not to be expected
to have full e¤ect as wage rates to apprentices are likely to increase. The
paper has shown that there are due reasons to expect higher incidence rates
than in the general case of subsidies to employment of union members. In the
general case of employment subsidies to unionised workers, the incidence rate
is less than one if employment is a normal good. In the case of employment
subsidies to vocational training, incidence rates can be one or larger than
one, depending on the preference structure of the union.
Financing subsidies by levies on employment is expected to counteract
the purpose of employment subsidies to vocational training. The combined
e¤ects of subsidies and nancing can actually result in diminished employ-
ment of apprentices and a reduction in the amount of vocational training.
If the goal of an empirical analysis is to obtain inference about the prefer-
ence structure of the union, one should follow the line of the classical papers
of Farber (1978) and MaCurdy and Pencavel (1986). A more modest re-
search agenda is to investigate if there actually are indications of incidence
of employment subsidy schemes to vocational training. As inferred from the
results of the present paper, knowledge of the preference structure of the
union is not enough to conclude about the amount of incidence; the impact
of the nancing scheme has to be taken into consideration.
The impetus to the present paper is the observation that apprentice wage
rose considerable after the introduction of employment subsides to vocational
training in Denmark, see Albæk (2009). However, the ability of aggregate
time series data to form the basis of inference about the present issue appear
to be limited. It is a di¢ cult task to disentangle the amount of incidence
of subsidies from the e¤ect of other factors of relevance for wage formation
for apprentices. Microdata appear more suited for empirical analysis of the
issue of incidence of employment subsidies to vocational training.
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